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TINA MUSCARELLA GOOCH*

Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds:
Should the Difference Matter to the
Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme?
ABSTRACT
The implementationof the Kimberley Process CertificationScheme
(KPCS) was designed to keep "conflict diamonds" out of the
legitimateinternationaldiamond market. This articleanalyzes both
the flaws and successes of the KPCS. It explores the United States'
domestic implementation of the internationalKPCS through the
Clean Diamond Trade Act and callsfor a change in the scope of the
diamonds that the KPCS regulates in order to eradicate the social
threats illegal diamonds pose to the internationalcommunity.
INTRODUCTION
Diamonds have occupied a cultural status all their own since De
Beers launched one of the most successful marketing campaigns of the
twentieth century.' As a result, it is now customary in many countries to
give a diamond ring as a symbol of engagement and marriage.2 In fact,
"Americans alone buy half of the diamond jewelry sold worldwide."3
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1. See FundingUniverse, De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited/ De Beers Centenary AG,
Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/De-BeersConsolidated-Mines-LimitedDe-Beers-Centenary-AG-Company-History.html (last visited Feb.
1, 2008) (Prior to the outbreak of World War II, De Beers began its first advertising campaign
to promote the romantic image of diamonds. The campaign began in the United States and
is best known for such phrases as "A Diamond Is Forever" and "Diamonds Are a Girl's Best
Friend."); Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process:Conflict Diamonds, VTO Obligations,and
the UniversalityDebate, 12 MINN. J.GLOBAL TRADE 1, 31 (2003) ("The De Beers company created
the image of the diamond solitaire as a symbol of love in the 1930s to recover dwindling sales
after the Great Depression.").
2. Price, supranote 1, at 31 ("Men and women from the United States, Europe, and Japan
(and increasingly China) now buy into the concept that a diamond engagement ring is the
'traditional' engagement token.").
3. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l USA, New Survey Shows U.S. Jewelry Retailers Are Not
Doing Enough to Combat Blood Diamonds, Say Amnesty International USA and Global
=
Witness (Feb. 22, 2007), availableathttp://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id
ENGUSA20070222002 (quoting Larry Cox, executive director of Amnesty International USA).
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Diamonds also show up in popular culture. They have been given the slang
term "bling"4 and are glorified as status symbols in music videos, song
lyrics, print ads, and on television shows. Until recent years, however, few
consumers have stopped to think about where these "priceless" gems come
from or the activities their sales fund.'
"Conflict diamonds,6 also known as 'blood' diamonds, are rough
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance armed conflict
aimed at undermining legitimate governments."7 This is a very narrow
definition that does not capture many kinds of illegal diamond trading
within its small scope. 8 "Illicit diamonds, in contrast, include conflict
diamonds as well as diamonds stolen or smuggled, undeclared for tax
evasion, used for money laundering, and other crimes." 9 In the grand
scheme of illicit diamond trading, conflict stones make up only a limited
portion, even though all forms of illegal diamond smuggling pose national,
international, and social threats that should be combated.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme ° (KPCS) was, and
continues to be, the United Nations' answer to conflict diamonds. It was
enacted at a time when these conflict stones flooded the diamond market

4. "Bling" is a slang term for diamonds popularized by rap artists. See B.G., Bling Bling,
on CHOPPER CITY IN THE GHETrO (Cash Money/Universal 1999) (rapping what the term
"Bling" stands for); see also NAS, Shine on 'Em, on BLOOD DIAMOND (DefJam Recordings 2006),
availableathttp://blooddiamondmovie.warnerbros.com/main.html (lastvisited Feb. 1, 2008)
(music video).
5. Diamonds are not actually scarce, but DeBeers, by appealing to consumer sentiment,
mass marketing, and purchasing excess supplies, has made diamonds one of the most
precious luxury items in the world. TOBIAS KRETSCHMER, DE BEERS AND BEYOND: THE HISTORY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIAMOND CARTEL 1 (London School of Business 1998), available at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-lcabral/teaching/debeers3.pdf.
6. See Nikos Passas & Kimberly Jones, Commodities and Terrorist Financing:Focus on
Diamonds, 12 EUR. J.CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 1, 6 (2006) (stating that conflict diamonds make up an
estimated four percent "of the entire trade, while illicit diamonds represent more" than 20
percent).
7. Kimberley Process, Frequently Asked Questions [hereinafter Kimberley Process
FAQs], http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/faqs/indexen.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
Another definition from the United Nations states that conflict diamonds "are rough
diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including
attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments." G.A. Res. 55/56, X, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Jan. 29,2001).
8. See Passas & Jones, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that, "[allthough the international
community's focus has been on the trade in conflict diamonds, the larger and more insidious
trade of illicit diamonds is comparatively neglected").
9. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
10. May 11, 2000 marked the first time a forum was held in Kimberley, South Africa "to
discuss the issue surrounding conflict diamonds. This meeting signified the start of the
Kimberley Process." DiamondFacts.org, Timeline of the Kimberley Process, http://www.
diamondfacts.org/pdfs/conflict/Kimberley-rocessTimeline.pdf(last visited Feb.22, 2008).
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and helped to fund rebel conflicts throughout Africa." The United States
passed the Clean Diamond Trade Acte 2 (CDTA) as the national scheme for
implementing the KPCS. Unfortunately, in the years since these tools have
been in place, many deficiencies have appeared.
On the one hand, some critics believe that the KPCS "'is more to
'3
sanitize the industry from the market side rather than the supply side.""
These critics feel that the KPCS allows people to buy diamonds with a clear
conscience because they think they are not buying blood diamonds. 4
However, the KPCS does not attempt to deal with the larger issue of the
illegal diamond trade. This allows consumers to overlook or remain
ignorant of the fact that the diamonds they purchase might still be funding
illegal activity outside the narrow definition provided by the KPCS. Further,
human rights advocates warn that the vague KPCS certification stamp
"merely allows Westerners to ignore what could be a gruesome reality
regarding diamond-mining practices." "
On the other hand, proponents of the KPCS believe that it "is an
example of international cooperation at its best."' 6 Proponents believe that
the "widespread and continued international support confers an important
measure of legitimacy upon the KPCS and acknowledges the efforts of KP
Participants and Observers. " 17 Further, they believe that the KPCS's "clear
distinction between the illegal and legal markets for rough diamonds" of all

11. Id. (February 13 through 16,2001 was " Ithe first time the term'Kimberley Process' was
officially used" when a "meeting of 38 governments of countries involved in the Kimberley
Process took place in Windhoek, Namibia."). See also U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Review of the KPCS, The Kimberley Process CertificationScheme: Third Year Review, 5, (Oct. 2006)
(stating that the "KPCS is not a legally binding document, as a matter of international law")
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Working Group].
12. Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3913 (2005).
13. Lydia Polgreen, Diamonds Move from Blood to Sweat and Tears, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/world/africa/25diamonds.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008) (quoting John Kanu, policy adviser to the Integrated Diamond
Management Program).
14. Id.
15. Jason Blalock & Joelle Jaffe, The Kimberley Process: A Public Relations Stunt or an
Effective Protocolto Clean Up the DiamondTrade?, in FRONTLINE WORLD, ADDMONAL RESOURCES
(2006), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/brazil5Ol/brazil5Ol-additional.htl(last visited Feb. 22, 2008) (stating that "Amnesty International is now pushing to add a
standardized monitoring system to the Kimberley Process and to make its rules legally
binding. By trusting nations to manage their valuable natural resources independently, the
Kimberley Process may be slowly moving the notoriously corrupt diamond trade toward an
undeserved legitimacy.").
16. Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 11, at 3.

17. Id.
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kinds has decreased the illicit diamond market and lowered their market
price relative to the cost of legitimate diamonds.18
Many of the brutal, diamond-funded conflicts have ended, and the
international community has taken steps to try to gain control of the rough
diamond trade. Nonetheless, the United Nations reports that illicit trading
of rough diamonds still exists and that it could potentially finance civil
conflicts, as well as criminal and terrorist activities.19 As one of the largest
consumers of diamonds in the world, if the United States does not make the
KPCS work, then the rest of the world will have little incentive to support
the process. Currently, the United States, along with all Kimberley Process
participant countries, is at a crossroads. What happens next will determine
if the process will succeed or fail.
However, there are feasible solutions that KPCS participants can
work towards achieving. If the KP is made binding and it is better
implemented both internationally and domestically, it can work. In the
latest Plenary, 20 participants set out four main issues to make the KPCS
stronger. Unfortunately, it is not enough in today's world to stop only blood
diamonds since there is proof that diamonds are also used to launder
money to fund terrorism.2' The current definitions of conflict diamonds in
both the KPCS and the CDTA are inadequate to curb this illicit diamond
trade. There is a real opportunity to stop such trade by changing how the
United States and the rest of the world combat it. If the definition in the
KPCS is simply tweaked to treat illicit stones no differently than conflict
stones, the KPCS and the CDTA remain viable. With such changes the
KPCS may still have enough bite to prevent its entire scheme from
becoming obsolete and in the process rid the diamond trade of illicit (and
thus encompassing conflict) gems. This would make a diamond's "road
from carbon to Cartier" less bumpy.'

18. Id. at 21.
19. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT, GAO-06-978, at

2 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
20. The Kimberley Process normally meets once a year in a Plenary reserved for
participating countries, industry leaders, and civil society members. These plenary meetings
provide the opportunity to meet face-to-face to discuss and assess the implementation of the
certification scheme. See Kimberley Process, Plenary and Intersessional Meetings,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/plenary-intersessionalmeeting-en.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
21. See Passas & Jones, supranote 6.
22.

Id. at 9.
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BACKGROUND
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)
In the 1990s, numerous rough diamonds became known as conflict
diamonds' because they were used to fund conflicts 24 and humanitarian
crises in African nations such as Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia. 25 In
response to these problems, the international community worked together
to take steps to control the rough diamond trade in order to cut off funding
for these brutal conflicts. The KPCS came out of this effort.
"In the Interlaken Declaration of November 5,2002, representatives
of the United States and 47 other countries announced the launch" of the
KPCS.26 The KPCS, however, is voluntary. Participating countries are
"expected to prohibit the importation of rough diamonds from, and the
exportation of rough diamonds to, non-Participants and to require that the
KPCS control all "shipments of rough diamonds. " ' "Participants" are states
and/or regional economic integration organizations, such as the European
Union, that have met the minimum requirements for the KPCS and are
eligible to trade in rough diamonds under the auspices of the Kimberley
Process.2
The KPCS came into effect on January 1, 2003. It requires each
participating country to track the diamonds it is exporting back to the place
where the diamonds were mined or to the point of import. 29 Each
participating country must meet standards for these internal controls.' °
Participants "are responsible for ensuring that the integrity of the

23. Id. at 6.
24. Diamonds are small, easy to hide, and difficult to identify. This makes them an
untraceable form of wealth that many rebel armies find useful. PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA,
KILLING KIMBERLEY? CoNFLIcr DIAMONDS AND PAPER TIGERS 4 (Joste Letourneau ed., 2006)
[hereinafter KILLING KIMBERLEY], available at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/
documents/killing%20kimberley.pdf.
25. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
26. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DIAMOND TRADING:
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. SANCIONS, available at http://www.treas.
gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/diamonds/diamond.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,

2008).
27. Id.
28. FAQs, supra note 7 ("Applicants" are states that "have expressed their commitment
to the [KPCS] but have yet to meet the minimum requirements of the KPCS." "Observers refer
to Industry and Civil Society groups that play an active role in monitoring the effectiveness

of the certification scheme..... Currently, there are three observers: the World Diamond
Council, Global Witness, and Partnership Africa Canada.).
29. Partnership Africa Canada, The Kimberley Controls:How Effective? (on file with Natural

Resources Journal).

30. Id.
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certification scheme is upheld and that the Kimberley Process works toward
preventing conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade of rough
diamonds."3' If a participant is deemed not to comply with the KPCS, "the
KPCS can expel or suspend a participant."32 Currently, 70 countries,
"including the European Community, voluntarily participate in the KPCS
and account for 99.8 percent of the global production of rough diamonds."'
There are seven key provisions of the KPCS. First, participants must
"enact or amend appropriate.. .laws to implement and enforce the
certification scheme and maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for
Violations."' Second, participants must" designate importing and exporting
authorities." Third, participants must "establish control systems to eliminate
conflict diamonds from the rough diamond trade." 3 Fourth, the KPCS
requires that participants ensure that a KP "certificate accompanies each
import and export shipment of rough diamonds."' Fifth, participants must
"acknowledge the receipt of rough diamond import parcels to the foreign
export authority."37 Sixth, participants must make sure the diamonds are
shipped in tamper-resistant containers. 38 Finally, participants must "collect
and maintain rough diamond data on production, imports, and exports"
and exchange the data with the KPCS. 3
The KPCS normally meets once a year in Plenary session.' These
meetings provide participants, industry leaders, and civil society members

31. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
32. Id. (noting, for example, that in July of 2004 the Republic of Congo was expelled from
the KPCS because the country "could not account for the origin of large quantities of rough
diamonds").
33. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 7; Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 11, at 15.
34. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. As of 2006, the United States had not complied with this standard since it failed
to confirm imports receipts with foreign exporting authorities. "For example, the United
States confirmed only 2 percent of rough diamond import shipments from Belgium in 2004
and only 18 percent in 2005. All other countries confirmed receipt of 95 percent of rough
diamond shipments from Belgium in 2004 and 97 percent of these shipments in 2005." Id. at
21.
38. Id. at 9. Notably, in April 2007, Customs and Border Protection Officers in Ohio
seized 957 small diamonds as they were being shipped from Spain to Indiana. The diamonds
were sent in an express mail box and were stored in a plastic baggie rather than in tamperresistant packaging as required by the KPCS. They also lacked a KP certificate as required by
the KPCS. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Dayton Customs and Border
Protection Officers Seize More than 900 "Blood Diamonds" from Express Hub Box (May 9,
2007), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/newsjreleases/
archives/2007_news_releases/052007/05092007.xml (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
39. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 9.
40. See Kimberley Process, supranote 20.
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a chance to meet to discuss and assess the implementation of the certification scheme.41 These meetings are closed to the public. However, an annual
Communiqu6 is published and made public once each meeting is
completed.'
In the 2006 KPCS Plenary session, the KPCS Participants agreed
that the following four issues would receive priority attention in 2007:
"funding and resource requirements; improving statistical data gathering
and analysis; effective and credible government oversight of industry; and
the treatment of illegal shipments." 3 The KPCS Participants also agreed on
"stronger internal control standards for participants who produce, trade,
cut, and polish diamonds."" This was thought to offer stronger "guidance
on implementing effective controls from mine to export and include
stronger government oversight of the diamond industry, including spot
checks of industry compliance." 45
The Clean Diamond Trade Act
The KPCS is important to the United States because it ensures the
protection of the legitimate trade in rough diamonds.' "Although the
United States is not a producer of rough diamonds, it is a significant global
trader of both rough and polished diamonds and the world's largest
consumer market for diamond jewelry." 47 Thus, the United States has a
stake in making sure that the KPCS remains viable so that the legitimate
diamond trade can continue to prosper without trading in conflict stones.
According to the KPCS, each participant is responsible for
implementing the scheme inside its own borders and making sure the
country continues to comply. On April 25, 2003, President George W. Bush
signed the Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA) in order to implement the

41. Id.
42. Id. (Meetings were held in Johannesburg, South Africa in April 2003; Sun City, South
Africa in October 2003; Gatieau, Canada in October 2004; Moscow, Russia in November 2005;
Gaborone, Botswana in November 2006; and Brussels, Belgium in November 2007.).
43. Kimberley Process Plenary, Final Communiqud, 2 (Nov. 6-9, 2006), availableat
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/plenary-intersessional-meeting-en.htm
(click on the link to Gaborone 2006 Final Communiqu6).

44.

Id. 3.

45. Id.
46. See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 7 n.7.
47. Id. at 2. "In 2003, the United States was the seventh largest exporter of rough
diamonds among non-mining KPCS participants.. .and the fifth largest exporter of polished
diamonds." Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

KPCS.4 Then, on July 29,2003, the President signed Executive Order 13312,
"Implementing the Clean Diamond Trade Act." 49 The Act requires that,
except to the extent that the President can modify the regulations,s' all
shipments of rough diamonds imported to the United States from a KPCS
Participant or exported from the United States to a KPCS Participant must
be accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate and sealed in a tamperresistant container.1
The United States must designate importing and exporting
authorities 2 and establish an interagency KP Implementation Coordinating
Committee to oversee U.S. implementation efforts.5 3 The U.S. government
also has the responsibility for overseeing any entity 4 involved in the
issuance of the KP certificates.' It has the ability to impose civil and
criminal penalties to enforce the CDTA. 6 Finally, the CDTA requires that
the United States support the collection and exchange of U.S. import and
export data of rough diamonds.'
The CDTA provides criminal penalties for any person or
corporation that violates any order or regulation issued under the Act.' The
CDTA authorizes criminal penalties up to $50,000 per count for corporations and individuals and/or ten years' imprisonment for individuals. 9
Civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation may be imposed on anyone
who violates, or attempts to violate, any order or regulation issued under

48. Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19,117 Stat. 631 (2003). "The act directs
the President to prohibit imports and exports of rough diamonds that are not controlled
through the KPCS. The act defines the term 'controlled by the Kimberley Process Scheme to
include any system that substantially meets standards, practices, and procedures of KPCS."
GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 3 n.6.
49. Exec. Order No. 13312, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,936 (Sept. 23, 2004).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 3903(b) (2005) (allowing the President, in certain limited circumstances,
to waive the prohibitions in the CDTA with respect to a particular country for periods of not
more than one year).
51. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supranote 26 ("The Kimberley Process certificates must bear
the following: the title 'Kimberley Process Certificate'; the statement, 'The rough diamonds
in this shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds'; country of origin for shipment of parcels
of unmixed origin; unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO
3166-1; date of issuance; date of expiry; name of issuing authority; identification of exporter
and importer; carat weight/mass; value; number of parcels in shipment; Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System; and validation by the exporting authority.").
52. 19 U.S.C. § 3905(a)(1)-(2) (2005); GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 9.
53. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 10.
54. This is currently the U.S. Kimberley Process Authority (USKPA). See id.
55. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 3904(c) (2005).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 3907 (2005).
57. Id. § 3909(b).
58. Id. § 3907(a)-(c).
59. Id. § 3907(a)(2).
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the CDTA. In addition, both civil and criminal United States customs laws
apply to rough diamonds imported in violation of the CDTA. s1
"Moreover, 18 U.S.C. 3571 provides that organizations or
individuals convicted of violating a criminal statute," such as the criminal
provisions in the CDTA, "may be fined the greater of the amount specified
in the statute, or twice the pecuniary gain or loss from the violation, or
$500,000 for felonies and that individuals may be fined $250,000 for
felonies."6 2 "Finally, 18 U.S.C. 1001 provides for five years' imprisonment
and a $10,000 criminal fine for knowingly making false statements or
falsifying or concealing material facts with respect to any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States." 63
The CDTA uses many U.S. agencies and the private, not-for-profit
entity U.S. Kimberley Process Authority (USKPA)" to "implement the
domestic and international provisions of the CDTA." 65The departments of
State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce, along with USKPA,
implement the domestic provisions of the Act. This includes preparing and
sharing the statistics of United States trade of rough diamonds to other
KPCS participants and convening regular interagency meetings.
The USKPA was set up and is run by officials from U.S. trade
associations 66 and is responsible for facilitating the issuance of the KP
certificates for exports of rough diamonds and reporting this to the U.S.
government. 67 The U.S. government currently does not have a plan for
monitoring the Kimberley Process
Authority and this is seen as a major
68
weakness in U.S. diamond law.
The World Diamond Council and Diamond Industry
Even before the Kimberley Process was being formulated, the
diamond industry was taking steps of its own to combat conflict diamonds.

60.

Id. § 3907(a)(1).

61. Id. § 3907(b).
62. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 26.
63. Id.
64. USKPA, overseen by the Department of State, is made up of 17 private entities from
the diamond industry that issue KP certificates that must accompany U.S. exports of
shipments of rough diamonds. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 25.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Trade associations include the Diamond Dealers Club and the Jewelers Vigilance
Committee. Global Witness, The U.S. Diamond Sector 2 (Briefing Paper Nov. 2006),
http://www.globalwitness.org/medialibrary-detail.php/8/en/the-us-diamondsector
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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In response to growing concerns over human rights violations against
innocent victims in diamond producing countries in central and western
Africa, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International
Diamond Manufacturers Association created the World Diamond Council
(WDC) in July of 2000.69
The WDC7 ° was created to develop, implement, and oversee a
"tracking system for the export and import of rough diamonds to prevent
the exploitation of diamonds for illicit purposes such as war and inhumane
acts."7' The inaugural meeting of the WDC occurred on September 7, 2000
in Tel Aviv, where the Council agreed to implement a comprehensive plan
to "curtail the trade in conflict diamonds while minimizing the impact on
the legitimate diamond trade."'
To complement the KPCS, "the international diamond and jewelry
industry initiated a voluntary system of warranties."7 3 For every diamond
transaction (rough, polished, or in jewelry) the system requires that the
seller affirm that the diamonds were bought through legitimate channels
and that they are not conflict diamonds.74 This is a more expansive warranty
system than a KP certificate since the KPCS only deals with rough
diamonds. Though this system is voluntary, the U.S. industry views it as a
requirement of all its members and noncompliance can result in expulsion
from diamond trade organizations. 75
WHAT HAS WORKED AND WHAT HAS NOT
The Clean Diamond Trade Act has not worked as the United States
had hoped it would when it was enacted in 2003. While the United States
has sought to enhance the reporting and accuracy of its rough diamond
trade data, "work remains to be done."76 There are many weaknesses in the
structure and reporting processes of the Act. These problems open the

69. Press Release, World Diamond Council, World Diamond Council Announces Fifth
Annual Meeting (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://diamondfacts.org/pdfs/media/press
release/WDC 5thAnnualMeetingFINAL.pdf.
70. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 11, at 67 (mentioning that the interactive
website www.diamondfacts.org was instituted at the WDC's own expense to provide
"information about diamond producing nations, the good diamonds can do for nations, and
more").
71. See Press Release, supra note 69.
72. DiamondFacts.org, supra note 10.
73. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 7 n.7; see Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 11, at 68
(encouraging the WDC "to continue its work of educating the trade in the functioning of the
KPCS and in the trade's responsibility to ensure its effective operation").
74. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 7 n.7.
75. Id. at 2.
76. Id. at 4.
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legitimate export and import of rough diamonds in the United States to
illicit diamonds77 They also expose the United States to possible KPCS
suspension or expulsion since deficient U.S. trade data has raised concerns
with other KP participants. 78 Such an expulsion could cause the whole
process to collapse.
"The United States does not periodically or regularly inspect rough
diamond imports or exports, a control feature that allows participants to
match the contents of the rough diamond parcels and Kimberley Process
certificates and deters illicit trade in rough diamonds."79 Inadequate
inspection leads to failure to report as well as inaccurate reporting. Without
government oversight, the current U.S. control systems cannot help deter
illicit rough diamonds from entering the diamond trade.8° Thus, the United
States must implement a more structured reporting and inspection regime
in order to make the CDTA work.
The United States also lacks an effective system for confirming the
import of rough diamonds and has no federal agency to track these
imports.8 ' Currently, for inbound shipments of rough diamonds to the
United States, the final consignees must report the receipt of the shipment
to the relevant exporting authority within 15 calendar days of the date the
shipment arrived at a U.S. port of entry. 2 This delegation of responsibility
for confirming rough diamond receipts has not worked. There is no U.S.
agency responsible for making sure that these import confirmations have
occurred. 8' In fact, the failure to report confirmations was only discovered
when other KPCS participants complained about the problem."4
In response to these complaints about missing information, the U.S.
government sent letters to about 150 U.S. importers reminding them of the
reporting requirement and warning that administrative subpoenas would
be issued to those importers who failed to report.s The government warned
that if any importer continues to fail to confirm import receipt, civil

77. Id.
78. See id. at 14.
79. Id.; see Ad Hoc Working Group, supranote 11, at 22 (The reporting of seizures and
cases of infringement or violations of the KPCS is not mandatory, although it is
recommended.).
80. See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
81. Id. at 14 (In 2004 and 2005, the United States did not confirm most import shipments
originating from four key U.S. trading partners [Canada, Belgium, Israel, and the United
Kingdom], and the United States "does not know the extent to which it has not confirmed
imports from other countries.").
82. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supranote 26.
83. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 22.

84. Id.
85.

Id. at 22-23.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

penalties might result.86 These superficial threats are inadequate to get the
much-needed data for the KPCS to function properly. The United States
needs to have a government agency in charge of this reporting function if
the KPCS is going to work. As of 2006, no steps had been taken to make
essential change.
Most disturbing, however, is that, more than three years after the
CDTA's implementation, the United States has not created a plan to oversee
the activities of the USKPA and its licensees, the body responsible for
issuing KP certificates.87 The pivotal job of issuing KP certificates, the
backbone of the KPCS, is left to the industry that has the biggest stake in
keeping the diamonds flowing freely, and the industry has little or no
supervision in issuing certificates. This means that there is no governmental
body making sure that the USKPA activities conform to KPCS standards at
the present time.
The USKPA also does not have a plan to supervise and review the
licensees that issue KP certificates in the United States.' Based on research
by the GAO, the USKPA cannot be sure that its licensees are meeting their
requirements to prevent illicit exports of rough diamonds from the United
States.89 More problematic for the USKPA are the reported problems with
the KP certificates it has issued. 90Such quality issues "raise the possibility
that the certificates have been tampered with and, thus, do not meet KPCS
requirements." 9'
In order for the CDTA to improve, in late 2006, the GAO
recommended that, at a minimum, the following should occur: (1) "the
processes for importing and exporting rough diamonds, including
conducting physical inspections periodically or regularly and confirming
rough diamond receipts with foreign exporting authorities" should be
streamlined to make it more effective and (2) "the oversight of the activities
of the USKPA and its licensees" needed to be improved. 2

86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 5. Notably, the State Department is currently developing and testing a plan to
allow periodic and systematic oversight of the USKPA. Id.
88. Id. at 39. In fact, the USKPA had only visited five of its 17 licensees in 2006. Id.
89. Id. at 28 (stating that the USKPA has no plan to conduct monitoring visits, no
protocol for selecting who would be visited, or any documentation, other than an annual
report, regarding reviews).
90. Id. In 2005, one country reported that 26 KP certificates had been sent with corrections
(i.e., whited-out to amend errors). Also, five certificates had incorrect dates and ten had
typographical errors. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 6. Two other recommendations were also made: (1) the accuracy of the U.S.
rough diamond trade data needed to improve and (2) U.S. diamond-related assistance needed
to be developed through a regional approach. Id.
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PROSECUTION UNDER THE CDTA
On February 4, 2007, Maliki Mohamad Diane, a naturalized U.S.
citizen born in Sierra Leone, and Kouate Saoud, of Guinea, were arrested
in the United States and charged with violating the CDTA. 93 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents seized 11,000 carats9 of diamonds,
estimated to have a value between $250,000 and $2 million." If convicted,
they face up to five years in prison.96 It remains to be seen how they will be
dealt with under the CDTA since they are among the first to face such
charges. 9'
The WDC stated, "The arrests that took place in Arizona provide
great evidence that [the WDC is] making progress and the Kimberley
Process is having an impact on stopping the illegal smuggling of
diamonds."" The WDC went on to state that the "United States has laws in
place to prosecute anyone who smuggles a diamond across an international
border without proper documentation." 9 This statement is evidence that
the WDC believes that all illegal smuggling is the target of both the KPCS
and the CDTA. Although as written these schemes are limited only to
conflict diamonds, statements such as these give hope that there is room to
broaden the scope of both to combat illicit diamond trading.
According to the GAO report, since 2003 the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) has seized seven shipments of rough
diamonds for violations of the CDTA.m "One case involved a rough
diamond import without a valid Kimberley Process certificate that was not

93. Dennis Wagner, 2 Arrested in Diamond Smuggling, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 9,2007,
at 14.
94. Id. "The word "carat" originated from the carob tree or Ceratonia siliqua. The tiny
seeds of this tree are well known for their uniformity and consistent weight. Diamonds were
weighed against these seeds until the system was standardised, and one carat was fixed at 0.2
grams." Sylvia Pfeifer, Stones of Contention, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 28, 2007, at 8.
95. Wagner, supra note 93.
96. Id.
97. See also United States v. Approximately 1,170 Carats of Rough Diamonds Siezed at
John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on Jan. 13, 2004, No. CV 2005-5816(ARR)(MDG), 2007 WL
2071863, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (concerning claimant Mark Kalisch, who was stopped for
allegedly attempting to import defendant diamonds into the United States from Brazil
without a KP certificate; the case is still pending).
98. Press Release, World Diamond Council, WDC Responds to U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Announcement of Seizure of Smuggled Diamonds (Feb. 9, 2007),
http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/press/wdc_020907.htm.
99. Id.
100. GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 20; see Ad Hoc Working Group, supranote 11, at 22
(noting that the reporting of seizures and cases of infringement or violations of the KPCS is
not mandatory, although it is recommended).
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packed in a tamper-resistant container. " "° Of the six other cases, three were
resolved through the administrative process; one of these three resulted in
a fine."° There are three open cases moving through administrative
procedures.'
Most recently, in May and June 2007, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers in Anchorage, Alaska "seized six shipments of smuggled
or possibly 'conflict' diamonds worth $350,000. "1°4Also, in April 2007, CBP
officers in Ohio seized 957 diamonds that were imported in violation of the
CDTA.' °5 The small diamonds were being shipped from Spain to Indiana in
an express mail box and were stored in a plastic baggie.' 6 In both cases, the
stones were not in tamper-resistant packaging and lacked a KP certificate,
both requirements of the KPCS.1 7 No arrests were made."m Interestingly,
the CBP called the stones "blood diamonds" and "conflict" stones since they
were in violation of the CDTA, even though CBP had no way to prove they
came from a conflict zone.
Thus, it appears that even within U.S. government offices there is
confusion about the difference between illicit and conflict stones. This may
be evidence that the purported difference should not matter in today's
international community or that, in fact, it no longer does matter. It also
may be evidence, however, that even the governmental offices charged with
enforcing the KPCS are ignorant about what the KPCS is trying to actually
accomplish.
While these examples all point to the CDTA working as planned,
none to date have actually utilized the CDTA penalties and statutory
regimes to prosecute anyone. One may ask why, but the answer seems to
be clear from the numerous issues of enforcement and implementation that
the GAO has noted in the CDTA. With rampant internal problems in the
process, 9 prosecutors will have a hard time overcoming the burden of
proof in any case. Until these issues are fixed, it is unlikely that any
prosecution under the CDTA will occur.

101.

GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 20.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Officers Seize Smuggled
"Conflict" Diamonds in Anchorage, Alaska (uly 19, 2007), availableathttp://www.cbp.gov/
xp/cgov/newsroom/newsreleases/07192007_2.xml.

105. Press Release, supra note 38.
106. Id.
107. See id.; Press Release, supra note 104.
108. See Press Release, supra note 38; Press Release, supranote 104.
109. How can one prove a KP certificate is a fraud when the USKPA cannot issue the
legitimate certificates correctly? How can one prove the stones are actually conflict gems
when the definition is narrowly construed to leave out illegal diamonds?
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The Kimberley Process has helped to bring "huge volumes of illicit
diamonds to the surface."" ° "It is estimated that during the 1990s, as much
as 20 [percent] of the world's diamonds are in some way illicit.""' While
some KP participants say that the "system was designed only to halt conflict
diamonds and not the wider problem of illicit diamonds,"" 2 it is hard to
imagine the world would turn the other cheek knowing the gems are used
as currency to fuel other illegal acts.
In the United States, little difference is mentioned between illicit
and conflict stones even though the narrower definition of conflict diamonds was used to draft the CDTA. This needs to change in order to allow
both the CDTA and the KPCS to catch more illegal diamond trading in their
nets.
THE RETAIL DIAMOND SECTOR
Most consumers only deal with the end retailer when they purchase
diamonds. However, the CDTA does not reach this key sector of the
diamond trade because the Act only applies to rough, rather than cut and
polished, stones. 113 A recent 2007 survey by Amnesty International USA"'
and Global Witness"' shows that the $33 billion per year American jewelry
retail industry fails to take adequate measures to help consumers avoid
conflict diamonds." 6 This survey of the 37 jewelry retailers listed by
National Jeweler magazine as $100 Million Supersellers was conducted
between December 2006 and February 2007.117 While many findings were

110. Partnership Africa Canada, supra note 29.
111. Id. They were used for money laundering and tax evasion and to buy drugs,
weapons, and other clandestine goods. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 11, at 54-55 (noting that "[w]hen the KPCS
was initiated.. .no thought was given to the possibility that conflict diamonds might be
concealed within a producer country by moving them straight from the mine to polishing,
thus avoiding all formal KPCS internal control requirements").
114. Amnesty International is a Nobel Peace Prize-winning grassroots activist organization that undertakes research and action focused on preventing and ending human rights
abuses, including violations of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination. Amnesty International, Who Are
We, http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are (ast visited Feb. 22,2007); see Press Release,
supra note 3.
115. Global Witness campaigns to achieve real change by highlighting the links between
the exploitation of natural resources and the funding of conflict and corruption. Global
Witness, About Us, http://w-ww.globalwitness.org/pages/en/about~us.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2008); see Press Release, supra note 3.
116. Press Release, supra note 3.
117. Id.
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disappointing,"' the survey did note a few "industry leaders such as
Helzberg Diamond Shops, Sterling (Signet), and Tiffany & Co. have taken
stronger measures" than most "to combat conflict diamonds, including
third party auditing."11 9 Overall, the survey urges the government to more
effectively oversee all sectors of the diamond industry to ensure widespread
compliance with the KPCS and other laws affecting the diamond industry
including the CDTA and anti-money laundering provisions.1 20 The United
States can monitor markets for guns, food, and tobacco. Thus, it is hard to
imagine that the retail diamond market is beyond governmental supervision. Oversight needs to occur in the retail sector if the world is serious
about ridding illicit diamonds generally, and blood diamonds specifically,
from the marketplace.
Jewelry buyer's guides warn that jewelers should be able to assure
buyers that "a diamond is not from conflict areas based on warranties that
follow the diamond to the retailer." 12' However, these warranties must
mean something. The International Diamond Manufacturers Association
and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, representing virtually all
significant processors and traders, have established a regime of self-regulation whose principal element is a system of warranties that accompany
invoices covering the sale of rough diamonds as well as diamond jewelry."
A retailer should only buy diamonds and diamond jewelry from dealers
and manufacturers who adhere to this "System of Warranties. " l"2 The

118. The main findings of the survey included "[h]alf of the leading American jewelry
retailers failed to respond to the requests to provide information about their policies on blood
diamonds... [56 percent] of those who did respond reported having no auditing procedures
in place to combat blood diamonds, despite recommendation to do so by the trade association
Jewelers for America," and 57 percent "of the top jewelers do not have any public information
posted on their websites about their policies on blood diamonds." Id.

119. Id.
120. See id.
* 121. Jayne O'Donnell & Christine Dugas, How to Shop Smartfor a Girl's Best Friend, USA
TODAY, Feb. 2,2007, availableathttp://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2007-0202-mym-diamond-usat-x.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
122.

JARED: THE GALLERIA OF JEWELRY, OUR DIAMOND SOURCING POLICY CUSTOMER

BROCHURE (2006) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
123. Id. A "Warranty" states,
For any product fabricated from rough diamonds mined from January
1, 2003 onward, the seller warrants that the diamonds have been purchased
from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and are in
compliance with United Nations Resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees
that the diamonds are conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or
written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds.
For any product fabricated from rough diamonds mined prior to January
1, 2003, the seller warrants that conflict diamonds will not be knowingly
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warranty is supposed to assure the retailer that the "supplier vouches for
the legitimacy of the merchandise and the supplier has, in turn, required the
same warranty from their sources of merchandise." 24
Retailers and other diamond companies who only deal with
polished diamonds have committed to carrying out the voluntary system
of warranties to support the KPCS even though both the CDTA and the
KPCS only apply to rough diamonds."25However, this voluntary system is
full of flaws and has been called more of a public relations exercise than a
credible system since there is nothing concrete backing up the policy." One
major flaw is the self-regulation that relies on a statement on an invoice that
is unverifiable and is not backed "by meaningful policies to prevent the
purchase of diamonds from conflict sources." 127 Another major flaw is that
members of the retail diamond sector are not required to carry out independent audits of the warranties to make sure they are legitimate. 128There is no
third-party monitoring or verification that companies are adhering to the
system. Also, the system of warranties is not fully implemented. While
many companies participate, not all do so since it is voluntary. By making
it mandatory, the warranty system could move from a "PR exercise" to a
credible system to combat conflict diamonds.129
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY
In 2006, at the Fourth Annual WDC meeting, Jeffrey Fischer, president of the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, suggested
that the system of the KP Certificate accompanying international shipments
of rough diamonds is operating
reasonably smoothly and according to design so that there is
actually very little to report about it....While it is not without
The importance of
flaw, it continues to improve constantly ....

sold and that, to the best of their ability, will undertake reasonable measures
to help prevent the sale of conflict diamonds in [the United States].

Id.
124. Id.
125. AMNESYINT'L&GLOBALWrrNESS,CONFUCrDIAMONDS:

USJEWELRY RETAILERS STILL
NOr DOING ENOUGH, SUMMARY OF US RESULTS OF GLOBAL WITNESS AND AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2007) (on file with Natural Resources Journal) [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF US RESULTS].

126. Amnesty Int'l, Conflict Diamonds:What's HappeningNow, http://takeaction. amnesty
usa.org/site/c.goJTIOOvEIH/b.2270757/k.CA70/PuLa-Stop-to.BloodDiamonds.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter What's Happening Now].
127. SUMMARY OF US RESULTS, supra note 125, at 5.
128. Id. at 5-6 (noting that some retailers have self-implemented third-party auditing and
have been applauded for their efforts).

129. What's HappeningNow, supra note 126.
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compliance - and the penalties of non-compliance are ,
becoming clear over time."
This rose-colored view of the KPCS is one the diamond industry promotes
in order to keep diamonds a symbol of love, not suffering. Statements like
these are not the only tactics used to promote a "clean" image of diamonds.
On May 9, 2007, the WDC held its annual meeting with government, nongovernment, and industry leaders coming together to discuss the issues
surrounding "the eradication of the flow of conflict diamonds" around the
world. 3' Coincidentally, this meeting came right before the Hollywood
release of the movie Blood Diamond.1 2 The movie, staring Leonardo
DiCaprio, Jennifer Connelly, and Djumon Hounsou, caused great concern
in the diamond industry because it portrayed the role of conflict diamonds
in Sierra Leone during its bloody civil war. Though the meeting focused on
the Kimberley Process as well as the success of the industry's "education
campaign"' 33 of 2006 and efforts to work on refining the core message of its
campaign for 2007, a great deal of time was spent on how to combat the
issues the movie would raise with consumers."
At the meeting, WDC president Eli Izhakoff emphasized the
importance of informing the public about the diamond industry's efforts in
order to dispel a "distorted image that sometimes is created by popular
media. " 135 The meeting participants also sent a letter to Edward Zwick, the
producer of Blood Diamond, "requesting that the movie provide accurate
and up-to-date information about the conflict diamond trade in Sierra
Leone, which is the country in which the movie was set.""36 Finally, to
prepare retailers for questions about its gems in the wake of the release of
the movie Blood Diamond,the diamond industry put together an informational website called diamondfacts.org, "educating jewelers and touting the
industry's participation" in the KPCS. 37 To cap the public relations

130. Jeff Miller, Hollywood Blood Diamonds PredateIndustry Actions, RAPAPORT NEws, Feb.
7, 2006, available at http://www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx?ArticlelD=14276.
131. Press Release, World Diamond Council, World Diamond Council Announces Fifth
Annual Meeting (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://diamondfacts.org/pdfs/media/press_release/WDC5thAnnuaLMeetingFINAL.pdf.
132. EDWARD ZwicK, BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc. 2006). For
more information about the movie visit http://blooddiamondmovie.warnerbros.com/main.

html.
133.

This "educational campaign" was launched in response to the Hollywood release of

the movie Blood Diamond and marked the industry's most expensive effort to reassure consumer confidence in diamonds. See World Diamond Council, Diamond Facts, http://www.
diamondfacts.org/media/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
134. See Press Release, supra note 131.
135. See Miller, supra note 130.
136. Id.
137. Mark Chediak, Diamonds Lose a Bit of Luster, ORLANDOSENTINEL, Feb. 13, 2007, at Al.
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campaign, at the 2007 Oscars, De Beers spent millions to persuade stars to
wear diamonds in return for a donation to South African charities."
While the WDC prepared for the backlash from the movie, others
believed that the movie's release would not dampen diamond sales but
instead would provide the industry with a great marketing opportunity to
champion the changes that have taken place in recent years." 9 It is,
therefore, unfortunate, that many of these purported changes have, in
effect, changed nothing but the vocabulary of how people talk about conflict
diamonds. The diamond industry is promoting the KPCS and the industry's
"warranty" system as sound and workable, when, in fact, both have
significant weaknesses that need to be fixed.
STATES IS NOT THE ONLY KPCS PARTICIPANT
THE UNITED
STRUGGLING
WITH IMPLEMENTATION
The KPCS achieved many of its initial objectives when it was first
implemented. It was able to significantly reduce the ease with which
conflict diamonds entered the legitimate diamond market, and it seemed to
work reasonably well. However, by mid-2006, the KPCS was showing signs
of strain."4 When "confronted with overt examples of obvious and serious
non-compliance in Brazil, Guyana, Ghana, and elsewhere," the KPCS
seemed to become "paralyzed." 4 Though the United States has trouble
managing the KPCS through the CDTA, other countries have exhibited
much greater flaws in their domestic and international systems. While
many participants have issues with the KPCS, this article will focus only on
the deficiencies illustrated by C6te d'Ivoire, Brazil, and Venezuela, since
they are currently the most egregious.
C6te d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
In November 2006, a report to the U.N. Security Council found that
significant volumes of conflict diamonds from the rebel-held area of the
C6te d'Ivoire were entering the legitimate diamond trade. 2 Though the
U.N. Security Council imposed a diamond embargo 43 on the C6te d'Ivoire,

138. See Sophie Goodchild & Andrew Gumbel, Blood and Bling at the Oscars, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 25,2007, at 6.
139. See Pfeifer, supra note 94 (emphasizing that the issue of conflict diamonds
"overshadows" the benefits that the diamonds bring to countries having them).
140. See Partnership Africa Canada, supranote 29.
141. Id.
142. The Diamond Registry, UnitedNations:Ivory Coast DiamondSmuggling a Concern, Nov.
2006, http://www.diamondregistry.com/News/2006/un.htm.
143. See S.C. Res. 1643, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1643 (Dec. 15, 2005).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

the report stated that between "$9 and $23 million worth of stones were
entering the [diamond] market though Ghana and Mali." 1" If proven true,
shipments would "'undermine the fundamental aim of the.. .Kimberley
Process, which was established to145ensure that all rough diamonds traded
internationally are conflict-free.'
In an open letter to Kimberley Process Chair Kago Moshashane,
many NGOs expressed concern about the trade in conflict diamonds that
originate in the C6te d'Ivoire and are being smuggled to Ghana and
subsequently sold under the guise of being legitimate stones.'" They
warned that if the KPCS did not take action to close the loopholes the
situation revealed, the KPCS was "in danger of becoming irrelevant."147 In
order to combat the situation, they urged the KP to "demand stronger and
more comprehensive government controls across the diamond pipeline to
ensure that conflict diamonds could not enter the legitimate diamond
trade."' 8
The government agency in Ghana that supervises the trade in
diamonds and gold, Precious Minerals Company Limited, called the U.N.
report "inaccurate." 149 However, the Final Communiqu6 from the
Kimberley Process Plenary in Botswana, issued in November 2006,
concluded that there were credible indications that Ghana was not in
compliance with its Kimberley Process obligations.'5°
Soon thereafter, "Ghana agree[d] to hold shipments until an
independent KP-approved evaluator was able to certify that any diamonds
offered for sale were Ghanaian and not Ivorian."' 5 ' Ghana also has agreed
to tighten its internal controls, to register all diggers and dealers, and 1to
52
allow a KP review team to review whether the country has done enough.
Ghana's continued membership in the Kimberley Process remains
dependant on the outcome of these changes." 3

144. The Diamond Registry, supra note 142.
145. Id. (quoting Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness).
146. Letter from Shane Kelleher, Amnesty International et al., to Kago Moshashane, Chair,
Kimberley Process (Nov. 3, 2006).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. The Diamond Registry, supra note 142.
150. Kimberley Process, Kimberly Process Plenary 1, 1 (Nov. 6-9, 2006), availableat
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/77110.pdf.
151. See Partnership Africa Canada, supranote 29.
152. Id.
153. Id.

Winter 20081

CONFLICTDIAMONDS

Brazil
"Brazil, with its rich supply of shallow alluvial diamonds, became
a part of the KPCS on August 1, 2003." 154 However, Brazil's internal
implementation of the KPCS was not "designed for real oversight, but
simply to provide token compliance with Brazil's responsibilities under" the
KPCS. 1' This compliance was proven ineffective on August 19, 2004 when
the National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) issued Kimberley
Certificate 64 for diamonds exported by Primieira Gema, a company owned
by Hassan Ahmad. 1' This certificate was clearly fraudulent because the
claims listed as the source of the diamonds in the KP certificate showed no
sign of ever having been mined for anything.157 When the Brazilian
government was informed of the fraud, the head of the DNPM stated that
since the diamonds had left the country, there was nothing Brazil could
do."58 The DNPM also made no plans to change its processing procedure
"even in light of this fraudulent export. " 5 9
In response to the Certificate 64 report issued by Partnership Africa
Canada (PAC), 16° the Brazilian Ministry of Mines issued a rebuttal report in
November 2005 at the KP Annual Plenary Meeting in Moscow. 1 6 1 The
DNPM presented photos with its report that purported to show mining
activity in the areas covered by Certificate 64.162 "The only problem was that
the photographs were of an area that had nothing to do with Certificate
64. "163 On February 10, 2006, Luiz Eduardo Machado de Castro, the author
Operation Carbon,
of the rebuttal report, was arrested in connection with
164
an operation targeting illegal exports of diamonds.

154.

See Blalock & Jaffe, supra note 15.

155. PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, FuGTVEs AND PHANTOMS: THE DIAMOND EXPORTERS
OF BRAZIL 3 (Shawn Gerald Blore ed., 2006) [hereinafter FUGITIVES AND PHANTOMS], available

at http://blooddiamond.pacweb.org/docs/fugitivesand_phantoms.pdf.
156. Id. at 4. Ahmad is a diamond exporter arrested in Brazil on February 17, 2006 who,
along with Paulo Traven, was believed to be running a large-scale operation for the illegal
export of diamonds using dummy corporations, phony front men, and illegal money traders.
Id. at 5,13.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id.
160. "Partnership Africa Canada works in partnership with organizations in Africa,
Canada and internationally to build sustainable human development in Africa." PAC was
created in 1986 and has funded innovative projects that support sustainable development in
Africa. Partnership Africa Canada, About PartnershipAfrica Canada, http://pacweb.org/e/
index.php?option=content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=50 (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
161. FUGITIVES AND PHANTOMS, supranote 155, at 8.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 10.
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If Brazil's Certificate 64 was not enough evidence of fraud in the
KPCS, Fabio Tadeu Dias de Oliveira is yet another example. This young
Brazilian died on July 17, 2001 in Slo Paulo.'" Interestingly, "[a]fter his
death, Fabio's fortunes improved markedly.""' In the 2005 Brazil Mining
Yearbook published by the DNPM, a list of the ten largest diamond
producers for 2004 in decreasing order of value of production ranked Fabio
as sixth in Brazil. 67 Fabio was responsible for 8.14 percent of the country's
commercialized diamond production a full three years after his death.'"
This rank is curious and points directly to fraud.
If all this was not bad enough, "Fabio is not the only ghost" in
Brazil's diamond export industry. 6 9 In fact, PAC research found: that 25
percent of Brazil's diamond exports "are the product of phantom miners."170
In April 2006, Brazil's own internal review showed that 49 of 147 KP
certificates issued by Brazil were fraudulent." Thus, over 30 percent of KP
certificates issued by Brazil have been fraudulent. The process in Brazil has
exhibited significant flaws that need to be fixed. This could be accomplished
by tighter internal regulations and oversight of the KP certificate-issuing
agency. If the Brazilian government cannot do this internally, the KPCS
Participant countries should either impose their own rules for Brazilian
exports or vote to suspend Brazil from the KPCS.
In light of these discoveries and accusations, a KPCS Peer Review
team was sent to visit Brazil on April 24,2006. At the time of the visit, Brazil
had voluntarily suspended its rough diamond exports."7 This suspension
was done in conjunction with Operation Carbon, the above-mentioned
"international and domestic criminal investigation of companies and
individuals" that had obtained KP certificates using fraudulent techniques." Brazilian police told the team that the diamonds fraudulently
exported came from three sources: Brazilian Indian reservations,

165. Id. at 6.
166.

Id.

167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8.

170. Id.
171. Amy Lin, The Greatest Story Ever Sold Isa FantasyCovered in Blood, WISEBREAD Jan. 4,
2007, http://www.wisebread.com/the-greatest-story-ever-sold-is-a-fantasy-covered-in-blood
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
172. Kimberley Process, Summary of Kimberley Process Review Visit to Brazil 1 (Apr. 24-29,
2006) [hereinafter Visit to Brazil], availableathttp://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/
review_visits_en.html (click on link to Brazil 2005 Review Summary).

173. Id.
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garimpeiro74 sites, and conflict zones in Africa."7 The 2006 peer review
found no evidence that "diamonds from African conflict zones had reached
Brazil"; however, the review noted that "the widespread smuggling and
weakness of internal controls" in Brazil allows the possibility that conflict
diamonds have already or could enter Brazil.176 This finding by the peer
review team concretely illustrated that the definitions of conflict diamonds
in the KPCS are too limited to actually prevent the illicit diamond trade
because, though there was rampant smuggling detected, none actually
violated the KPCS since no diamonds were conclusively identified as
coming from African conflict zones. Thus, the KPCS participating nations
had no responsibility to prevent the illegal trading.
Venezuela
Venezuela participates in the KPCS. However, though diamond
mining continues there, "Venezuela has mysteriously recorded no diamond
shipments since 2005."17IA PAC investigation found that all of the country's
diamonds, an estimated 150,000 carats annually, were being illegally
exported without complying at all with the KPCS. 7
In the PAC investigation, the group also found concrete evidence
that Venezuelan diamonds are being smuggled into Guyana for export
rather than complying with the KPCS.Y As Venezuelan diamond production has declined from around 300,000 carats per year to less than 30,000,
Guyana's diamond mining has skyrocketed, from close to 50,000 carats to
just under 400,000 carats per year."s The Venezuelan decline coincides with
the implementation of the KP and the lack of reported diamond exports. 8'
Also, sadly, individual miners and cooperative officers openly admitted
they hide a majority of their diamond production from the government and,
thus, the KPCS. 82
Far more alarming, however, is the fact that in the 18 months since
a name change in the Ministry of Mines left no one with legal authority to
174. FUGITIVES AND PHANTOMS, supra note 155, at 2 (translating garimpeiros as meaning
"hand-miners" in English).
175. Id. at 13.
176. Visit to Brazil, supra note 172, at 3.
177. KILLING KIMBERLEY, supra note 24, at 15.
178. PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE LcsrWORLD DIAMOND MINING AND SMUGGLING
IN VENEZUELA 1 (Shawn Gerald Blore ed., 2006), available at http://blooddiamond.pacweb.
org/docs/the lostworld.nov2006.pdf [hereinafter DIAMOND MINING AND SMUGGLING IN
VENEZUELA].
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sign KP certificates, no one in Venezuela's government has had the will or
interest to make the simple change to fix the problem."s Currently, no one
in Venezuela can issue KP certificates and no one seems to care. Through
its investigation, PAC believes that a significant number of Venezuelan
diamonds left the country without KP certificates and entered the United
States and Europe."s These findings imply that a considerable subset of the
world's rough diamond buyers do not comply with the Kimberley
Process.1s 5
One can guess that little attention had been paid to these
deficiencies in Venezuela until PAC arrived because there is no proven link
between these illicit stones and conflict diamonds from rebel zones. The
narrow definition of conflict diamonds that the KPCS currently uses
prevents flaws in the system, like those purported in Venezuela, from being
remedied in a timely fashion. The illicit trade in diamonds needs to be
stopped, just like the trade in conflict stones does. Fortunately, a high-level
review mission from the KPCS will be sent to Venezuela sometime in the
near future to ascertain if it should be allowed to remain in the KPCS.s 6
POSITIVE STEPS

Recently, the Kimberley Process participants have decided to
publish, for the first time, figures on rough diamond production and trade
data." 7 "'While there was not consensus on this degree of transparency
when the scheme began [in 2002], all participants now agree to the new
level of openness.' ' 1 88 This new publication provides tangible hope that the
participants want to make the process more clear and accountable. By
allowing public access to this information, hopefully countries like the
United States, that are currently lacking in the reporting requirements of the
KPCS, will feel pressure from the international community to report. This
is a positive step in the KPCS.
While the peer review team in Brazil noted significant flaws, they
also praised its public database. The peer review noted that the Brazilian
Cadastro Mineiro represents a level of transparency and public access that

183. Id. at 4.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 4.
186. See id. at 17.
187. Press Release, European Commission, Kimberley Process: Commission Welcomes
Boost to Diamond Scheme Transparency (Apr. 2,2007), availableathttp://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/456&format=html&aged=O&language=EN&gui
Language=en; see also Partnership Africa Canada, supra note 29.
188. See European Commission, supranote 187 (quoting Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European
Commissioner for External Relations and Neighborhood Policy).
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is a best practice that could be emulated by other KPCS participants. If
this database were connected into "a reporting and verification structure,"
it could become "a powerful tool in building a system to eliminate the
potential presence of conflict diamonds and to combat fraud and money
laundering" in the industry. 19°
Finally, in 2006, the Working Group on Statistics (WGS) reported
that the KPCS "monitored $37.6 billion in rough diamonds exports
9
representing more than 500 million carats of rough diamonds."' '
92
"Participants issued 59,000 certificates to accompany those shipments,"'
]
and "[t he WGS reported that participants are reporting data regularly and
the quality of the data and the analysis has improved." 93 Thus, while this
article has pointed out the flaws in the KPCS in many participating countries, there are many other countries that have taken the KPCS seriously.
These statistics prove that the KPCS, while not perfect, is workable with a
few changes needed to make it more sound than it currently is.

CONCLUSION
It should not matter to the international community whether a
diamond is illicit or a conflict stone; both are illegal and should be
prevented from entering the legitimate diamond market. However, the
current drafting of both the KPCS and the domestic CDTA place emphasis
on this difference and it affects how effective each scheme is. As PAC has
aptly noted,
There may be a feeling that conflict diamonds are "over", that
massive diamond fraud under the KP banner in countries like
Brazil and Guyana is "just" money laundering or theft or
some other thing, and that the Kimberley Process need not be
concerned. If true, this makes a fraud of the KP process
itself. 194
It is up to the diamond industry, governmental and non-governmental
organizations, and, on a more fundamental level, the end consumer of the
diamonds to stand up and say that whether illicit or conflict, illegal
diamonds will not be tolerated. They harm our global community and all
illegal diamonds should be prevented from entering the legitimate diamond
markets that benefit so many. The KPCS and the CDTA need to reflect this
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change in scope if diamonds are to ever be rid of their less than shiny uses
in illegal activities. As WDC Chairman Eli Izhakoff said, "for the international diamond industry and all its dependants around the world, failure
[of the KPCS] is not an option."9 5 Thus, the international and domestic
community needs to make the issue of illicit diamonds a priority in the
coming years to ensure that the KPCS does not fail.
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